CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1          BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The conflict in Afghanistan is one of the longest contemporary  conflicts involving an international coalition of military forces . In October 2001, the United States of America initiated air strikes on Afghanistan, followed by a ground offensive called Operation Enduring Freedom, to topple the Taliban government and drive out Al Qaeda forces hosted in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 t errorist attacks on the United States.  Since then, armed conflict has covered many parts of the country. The intensity of the conflict has been growing significantly, with a resurgent Taliban and a number of other non-state armed groups pitted against Afghan government forces and an international coalition of some 150,000 military personnel serving in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom. This article  looks at the application and implementation of international law by armed non-state actors (ANSAs ) in Afghanistan. We approach these issues by investigating the application to these actors of both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law frameworks. In the first part of this article, the regimes under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II and their relevance for ANSAs operating in Afghanistan will be analysed in detail. A brief enquiry into customary IHL will also provide an insight into other applicable rules. While the applicability of human rights law to the behaviour of ANSAs remains highly controversial, the practice of international organizations is pointing towards increased accountability of those actors for human rights violations, at least at the political level. From a legal point of view, such accountability seems to be more accepted when ANSAs exercise control over territory or a segment of the population, or when core human rights norms are at stake. Finally, the article assesses efforts to implement the applicable law in Afghanistan and considers what more could be done to improve respect by ANSAs, particularly the Taliban.

                The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate; the Taliban-led insurgency retains control of the strategic initiative, and the International Coalition (IC) lacks clear direction. The insurgency has made significant inroads in the past months, consolidating its grip in the South and East, securing its sanctuary in Pakistan, and opening new fronts in the North. The situation around Kabul is unclear. Taliban leaders are now convinced that the International Coalition will soon be compelled to accept the facts on the ground and abandon Afghanistan in a few years.  Since the Bush administration’s departure, the United States has tried to develop a strategy for defeating the Taliban. Nonetheless, the recent initiatives lack coherence and do not offer a credible response to the advance of the insurgency. Worse, while some measures are useful, others are potentially dangerous and could very well accelerate the pace at which the Taliban gain ground. The biggest mistake is to concentrate reinforcements in the South, while failing to react quickly and decisively to stop Taliban inroads in the North, where success now would be readily achievable. The Taliban’s strength explains why the reinforcements sent in 2009 (21,000 troops) cannot beat the Taliban in their southern and eastern strongholds. Sealing the border would be politically difficult, and the burden of doing so would fall primarily on the United States. In addition, it would take time, since the Taliban have the momentum. Defeating the Taliban would require at least 100,000 new reinforcements as long as the Afghan–Pakistani border remained open to insurgents. Neither the United States nor NATO is willing or able to pay the human and fiscal costs of reinforcements at this level. Even if they were, sealing the border would be extremely difficult in political and military terms and would take considerable time. There would also be a risk of the situation in the North deteriorating significantly in the meantime. Indeed, under the current strategy of concentrating new forces in the South and East, the Taliban will move the insurgency to the North.

1.2          STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The diversity of the insurgency  confuses many foreign observers. First, the Taliban are not the only party fighting against the IC(???) and the Afghan government. The Hezb-i islami (an Islamic organization commonly known for fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan), with a more local and limited following, has its own independent organization. In the North especially, the Hezb-i islami can more easily recruit from non-Pashtun ethnic groups.  Second, while it is true that the Taliban have multiple commanders, some with “star” quality that may suggest internal rivalry, this does not mean that the Taliban are inchoate or divisible. The Taliban’s structure is resilient: centralized enough to be efficient, but flexible and diverse enough to adapt to local contexts (in addition, the Taliban have been pragmatic in their use of criminal gang and opium resources). Maulani Haqqani enjoys great prestige due to his bravery during the jihad against the Soviets and some autonomy in the day-to-day management of the war in the eastern provinces. But Haqqani’s network is not independent of the larger Taliban network and does not have an autonomous strategy. He does not appoint cadres on his own authority or have an autonomous strategy. Haqqani obviously is not competing with Mullah Omar for the Taliban leadership. His biography indicates a strong commitment to the Taliban and he comes from the same madrasah network as the Taliban leadership of the 1990s. Rather than a weakness, the local autonomy of Taliban commanders is necessary due to the nature of guerilla warfare, and in fact, it constitutes a strength. The Taliban are not confused or in conflict over who is in charge in a particular district or province. Foreign observers recalling Iraq may wishfully imagine exploiting competition or infighting among Taliban commanders, but the fissures are not there.

                During the Taliban's reign in the 1990s, only three nations recognised its government: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. And though no country has formally recognised the group's leadership in Afghanistan since they again took power this year, some have expressed their vocal support for its rule. It is to this regard the study is based on insurgency and the evolving role of international politics using the Taliban as the case study.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The study seeks to examine insurgency and the evolving role of international politics. The objectives of the study are :

1.            To critically examine the Taliban insurgency and its effect on Afghanistan

2.            To determine  the cause of Taliban insurgency

3.            To evaluate  the rise and fall and rise of the Taliban group

4.            To examine  the prospectS for/OF negotiations with the Taliban

5.            To determine the relationship between Taliban and international politics 

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions guide the objectives of the study :

1.            How does the Taliban insurgency affect the state Afghanistan?

2.            What is the cause of Taliban insurgency?

3.            What lead to the rise and fall and rise of the Taliban group?

4.            What is the prospect for negotiations with the Taliban?

5.            What is the relationship between Taliban and international politics?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The/THIS study on insurgency and the evolving role of international politics will throw more light on the activities of the Taliban group and Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan . The study findings of the study  will also establish a correlation between Taliban and international politics . The study will also serve as a source of information to higher institutions and other researchers and contribute to the body of the existing literature on insurgency and the evolving role of international politics.

1.6 Scope of the Study                                                          

The study covers on insurgency and the evolving role of international politics with focus on the Taliban