CHAPTER ONE
- INTRODUCTION
- BACKGROUND OF STUDY
Violence is distinguished by its instrumental character.
Phenomenologically, it is close to strength, since the implements of violence, like other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength until, in the last stage of their development, they can substitute for it.
At first glance these distinctions seem arbitrary as if she were offering stipulative definitions without justifying them. They certainly do not correspond to the ways in which we ordinarily use these terms, and more significantly, they do not correspond to any standard uses of these terms by political theorists or philosophers. Furthermore, her characterizations are so condensed that they invite all sorts of questions. Arendt denies that they are arbitrary, although she admits that they “hardly ever correspond to watertight compartments in the real world.”20 But if we are to be persuaded that they are not arbitrary then we need a fuller account of their meaning and rationale and this is the issue I want to pursue in regard to power and violence.
Arendt’s description of power is not an isolated attempt at redefinition. Rather it links up with a whole network of concepts that she had been elaborating ever since The Human Condition (and even earlier): action, speech, plurality, natality, public space, isonomy, opinion, persuasion, and public freedom. Collectively, these concepts texture her vision of political life and are the background for her approach to power and violence. Arendt states: Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and inhabit the world. Plurality has a distinctive meaning for Arendt: it involves individuality, distinction, and equality.
Every individual brings a distinctive perspective to a common world. Plurality is rooted in our natality, the capacity to begin,
to initiate action spontaneously. “To act in its most general sense, means to take initiative, to begin to set something in motion.”Action and speech are intimately related because it is by our words and deeds that we reveal our unique distinctiveness in the company of others. Political equality, the equality that characterizes plurality, is what the Greeks called isonomy. In the polis “men met one another as citizens and not as private persons. The equality of the Greek polis, its isonomy, was an attribute of the polis and not of men, who received their equality by virtue of citizenship, not by virtue of Arendt frequently characterizes beginning and initiating as a “miracle.” But one should be careful about drawing misleading inferences about political theology from the use of her talk about the “miracle” of beginnings.
The following passage states clearly what she means:“To ask in all seriousness what such a miracle might look like, and to dispel the suspicion that hoping for or, more accurately, counting on miracles is utterly foolish and frivolous, we first have to forget the role of miracles have always played in faith and superstition – that is, in religions and pseudo religions. In order to free ourselves from the prejudice that a miracle is solely a genuinely religious phenomenon by which something supernatural breaks into natural events or the natural course of human affairs, it might be useful to remind ourselves briefly that the entire framework of our physical existence the existence of the earth, of organic life on earth, of the human species itself rests upon a sort of miracle. For, from the standpoint of universal occurrences and the statistically calculable probabilities controlling them, the formation of the earth is an “infinite improbability.” And the same holds for the genesis of organic life from the processes of inorganic nature, or the origin of the human species out of evolutionary processes of organic life. It is clear from these examples that whenever something new occurs, it bursts into the context of predictable processes as something unexpected, unpredictable, and ultimately causally inexplicable just like a miracle. In other words every new beginning is by nature a miracle when seen and experienced from the standpoint of the processes it necessarily interrupts.
In this sense that is within the context of processes into which it bursts the demonstrably real transcendence of each
beginning corresponds to the religious transcendence of believing in miracles.” Hannah Arendt’s Reflections on Violence and Power birth. We see more clearly why Arendt rejects the idea of political power as power of one individual or group over another – why she categorically rejects the idea that the crucial question of politics is “Who rules Whom?” Politics involves acting together; it is based upon human plurality and citizens encountering each other as political equals. In the public space created by acting together, citizens debate and deliberate with each other; they seek to persuade each other about how to conduct their public affairs.
Although Arendt tells us that there has been a reluctance to deal with violence as a phenomenon in its own right, there is nevertheless a consensus of theorists from the Left to Right to think that “violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power.” She quotes C. Wright Mills who starkly affirms: “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate power is violence.”
This declaration echoes “Max Weber’s definition of the state as ‘the rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate violence. This well entrenched paradigm of power, which has a long history claims that power is the rule of an individual, group, or state over others. Power is understood to be power over. If this is the way we think of power, then it makes perfect sense to claim that the ultimate kind of power is violence. This is precisely the conception of power that Arendt challenges – and her point is not merely one of linguistic propriety. It goes to the very heart of her political thinking. Power and violence are not only distinguishable; they are antithetical. Where power reigns there is persuasion, not violence. And when violence reigns, it destroys power. She is critical of the question that many political theorists
and philosophers have taken to be “the most crucial political issue”: “Who rules Whom?” Arendt insists that serious political thinking requires making careful distinctions.
The failure to do so indicates not only “a certain deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has resulted in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to. And she distinguishes “power,” “strength,” “force,” “authority,” and “violence.” Each of these key
terms refers to distinct and different phenomena. Although my focus will be on power and violence, let me briefly review her range of distinctions.
- STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Violence is widely sanctioned in certain cases, such as self-defense; protection of innocents; in opposition to crimes against humanity. Thus, the assassination of Hitler would no doubt have been near-universally accepted as being a ‘good thing’, to mention just one clichéd example. Power does not need any justification since it exists in the very being on all political communities. It appears when people bind together, do things together, bring out new and creative treasures into the world. This is because for Arendt, power is a feature of action and reaction insofar as people understand one another’s words and deeds and coordinate with one another to achieve mutually understood ends. Different from power defined as effectiveness of command, which would logically include violence in its repertoire, Arendt’s understanding of power emphasizes collective human actions which rests on persuading subjects in the here and now to cooperate.
Power requires of those involved their existence as human beings who act.
In Arendt’s words: “What makes a man a political being is his faculty of action; it enables him to get together with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises that would never enter his mind, let alone the desire of his heart, had he not been given this gift to embark on something new.” For a human being to accept the other’s power depends on the degree to which words and deeds can be understood. In this sense, power depends on speech and persuasion, it precludes violence. In fact, violence becomes its opposite.
Finally several research has been carried out on violence as anti-politics but not even a single research has been carried out on violence and power of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy: critical analysis.
- AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The main aim of the study is to study violence and power of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy: critical analysis. Other specific objectives of the study includes;
1. to determine the relationship between violence and power as seen in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy.
2. to determine the effect of violence and power as seen in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy.
3. to determine the factors affecting violence and power as seen in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy.
4. to determine the extent to which violence and power have affected political philosophy.
5. to proffer possible solutions to problems.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the relationship between violence and power as seen in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy?
2. What is the effect of violence and power as seen in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy?
3. What are the factors affecting violence and power as seen in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy?
4. What is the extent to which violence and power have affected political philosophy?
5. What are the possible solutions to problems?
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
Hannah Arendt tells us that there has been a reluctance to deal with violence as a phenomenon in its own right, there is nevertheless a consensus of theorists from the Left to Right to think that “violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power.” She quotes C. Wright Mills who starkly affirms: “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate power is violence.”
This declaration echoes “Max Weber’s definition of the state as ‘the rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate violence. This well entrenched paradigm of power, which has a long history, claims that power is the rule of an individual, group, or state over others. Power is understood to be power over. If this is the way we think of power, then it makes perfect sense to claim that the ultimate kind of power is violence. This is precisely the conception of power that Arendt challenges – and her point is not merely one of linguistic propriety. It goes to the very heart of her political thinking.
Power and violence are not only distinguishable; they are antithetical. Where power reigns there is persuasion, not violence. And when violence reigns, it destroys power. She is critical of the question that many political theorists and philosophers have taken to be “the most crucial political issue”: “Who rules Whom Arendt insists that serious political thinking requires making careful distinctions. The failure to do so indicates not only a certain deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has resulted in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to. And she distinguishes “power,” “strength, force,” “authority,” and “violence. Arendt’s distinctive concept of power and why she sharply distinguishes it from strength, force, authority, and violence. Power, as we have indicated, is not to be understood in a vertical hierarchical manner where it is taken to mean control or domination over another individual or group. Power is a horizontal concept: it springs up and grows when individuals act together, seek to persuade each other, and treat each other as political equals. power comes into being only if and when men join themselves together for the purpose of action, and it will disappear when, for whatever reason, they disperse and desert one another.
Hence, binding and promising, combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept in existence; where and when men succeed in keeping intact power which sprang up between them during the course of any particular act or deed, they are already in the process of foundation, of constituting a stable worldly structure to house, as it were, their combined power of action. Power then, along with tangible Power then, along with tangible public freedom, stands at the center of her political vision. Consequently, violence is the antithesis of power. “Power and violence are opposites; where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence is anti-political. So strictly speaking the very idea of political violence is self-contradictory.
Finally the study will contribute to the existing literature and knowledge to this field of study and basis for further research.
1.7 SCOPE OF STUDY
The study on violence and power of Hannah Arendt’s is limited to political philosophy.
1.8 LIMITATION OF STUDY
Financial constraint- Insufficient fund tends to impede the efficiency of the researcher in sourcing for the relevant materials, literature or information and in the process of data collection (internet, questionnaire and interview).
Time constraint- The researcher will simultaneously engage in this study with other academic work. This consequently will cut down on the time devoted for the research work.
1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS
VIOLENCE
The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal development or deprivation.
POWER
Is the ability to influence others to believe, behave, or to value as those in power desire them to or to strengthen, validate, or confirm present beliefs, behaviors, or values.
POLITICAL
A set of activities associated with the governance of a country
